INTRODUCTION
The neurologist often savours the intellectual privilege of his habitual dealings with the human nervous system. While much remains to be discovered about the human brain, many of its astounding capabilities are plainly manifest. One is its capacity to generate consciousness-the ability to sense the environment and display goal-directed behaviour; to think, to feel, and ultimately to cogitate on itself. Reflective people of all cultures have considered the issue of consciousness; speculations on the subject have historically come from religious leaders and philosophers. In recent years, perspectives have been added from fields as diverse as computer science, linguistics, psychology and physics. For the clinician, the study of cognition in the context of neurological disorders offers several unique avenues for inquiry and speculation. In this article, the pathophysiological richness of the epilepsies is illustrated as one such avenue.
EPILEPSY AND CONSCIOUSNESS SELECTED EARLY WRITINGS
John Hughlings Jackson wrote on epilepsy for over forty years . While his name is commonly associated with the definition of 'seizure' and an eponymous seizure type, he saw much further: '. . . A carefully observed convulsion . . . as an anatomical and physiological experiment, although a rough one, on part of the brain' 1 . For him, the different seizure semiologies illuminated the functional topography of the brain: '. . . although the functional alteration is the same in all epilepsies, the seats of those functional alterations are various'. While unaware of the anatomical basis of temporal lobe epilepsy, he noted the 'reminiscences', 'volumnious mental states' and 'dreamy states' of some of his epileptic patients. When, years later, some of these patients came to autopsy, he described identifiable temporal lobe pathology; thereon, he denoted such seizures as 'uncinate fits'. In historical terms, the identification of an epileptic state with an altered state of consciousness, and further, with disordered brain structure, had begun.
In this century, the seminal work of the Canadian neurosurgeon Wilder Penfield echoed the Jacksonian legacy: '. . . The epilepsies throw much light on the mechanisms of the brain' 2 . In classic electrocorticographical experiments on awake patients undergoing craniotomy, Penfield described the differences between the elementary somatosensory responses obtained from stimulation in the perirolandic area from the more complex manifestations ('psychical responses') from the temporoparietal cortices. Detailed experiments on over a thousand subjects re-vealed common underlying patterns. Stimulation of temporoparietal cortex of either hemisphere produced either 'experiential' (recall of past events) or 'interpretive' (feelings of familiarity, unfamiliarity, fear, and other emotions) responses. When stimulation in the deeper temporal lobe (the periamygdaloid areas and uncus) and the prefrontal cortex was followed by electrical afterdischarge, Penfield also observed absences and automatisms. An overall analysis of his experience 2 led him to summarize the cerebral topography of consciousness into two components: (i) localized specific functions, such as speech, memory and affect, and (ii) a more diffuse system of awareness and conscious integration, centred subcortically (in a region he termed the 'centracephalon'). The anatomical substrate for the latter began to be defined from animal experimental work in the 1940s. Marshall and Magoun 3 describe Morison and Dempsey's early work on identifying the 'recruiting response' of the cortex following thalamic stimulation: a diffuse response from large areas of the cortex was noticed to localized stimuli applied to the interlaminar nuclei of the cat thalamus. Herbert Jasper, an associate of Penfield, demonstrated the striking reproduction of both the electrical 4 and behavioural 5 characteristics of 'petit-mal' epilepsy by repetitive stimulation of the intralaminar thalamus. Moruzzi and Magoun's experiments 6 revealed the existence of an 'ascending reticular activating system'.
Penfield's basic ideas (we shall see) are still fashionable today, despite his despondency regarding solving the mind-body problem in his later years 7 .
THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF CONSCIOUSNESS
What exactly do we mean by consciousness? Formally defining it can be difficult or controversial 8, 9 ; it is easier to describe the phenomenon and discuss its attributes. Everyone has some notion of what it is to be conscious, and few would disagree with the following subjective features 10, 11 :
• The sense of identity or 'me', that pervades and attaches itself to percepts and affects-'I feel pain', 'I see red', etc.;
• 'Qualia', i.e. the term introduced by philosophers to denote the intense and irreduciably personal sensory experience of percepts-the blueness of blue, the wetness of water, and so on;
• The possession of an identity and directed cognitive faculties (and an appreciation of that possession) that exists in the spatiotemporal context of an orderly external world, that, despite the everchanging flux of mental experience, continues largely unchanged from day to day and is subject to predictable laws.
From an objective standpoint, consciousness includes 10 :
• An integrated, coherent, controlled character of behaviour;
• Detection and adaptation to novelty;
• Goal-directed behaviour;
• Use of language;
• Use of certain forms of representation, such as declarative (i.e. associative) memory;
• Metacognition (i.e. representation of one's ownand others'-mental processes).
One of the many challenges of the subject of consciousness is reconciling the subjective and objective aspects through a unified theory. The issue of qualia is a favourite: how can the personal experience of the colour red ever be reduced to the description of neuronal activity? This issue is notoriously difficult, but it may be that such riddles arise from methodological and semantic confusion 12 . In the study of consciousness, much as in other branches of science, particular care needs to be taken about the conceptual level of questions before answers can be provided.
How does current neurobiological knowledge measure up to the above issues? One may argue whether consciousness will ever be fully 'solved', but most neuroscientists will agree that current and future advances offer hope. The clinical neurologist is, however, convinced that consciousness certainly has something to do with the workings of the brain as we know it-witness the myriad disorders of consciousness encountered in clinical practice.
Let us specifically see what the epilepsies may teach him.
THE GENERALIZED SEIZURE: CONSCIOUSNESS VERSUS UNCONSCIOUSNESS
The most dramatic alteration of consciousness is its reversible extinction during the course of a generalized convulsion. The loss of consciousness during, and following, such a seizure illustrates the most basic of differences between the conscious and non-conscious state, i.e. either being 'awake' or not. The evident loss of perception, goal-directed behaviour, speech, and other such faculties during nonwakefulness suggests the first of a series of key facts:
• Observation 1: Consciousness is hierarchical; the faculty of 'wakefulness' is perhaps its most fundamental aspect.
Where might the anatomical seat of wakefulness lie, and what is its relation to epilepsy? The modern view 13 is that wakefulness, in the absence of substantial cerebral hemispheric pathology, is derived from the rostral mesencephalic reticular formation. A dorsal ascending pathway from there terminates in the nonspecific thalamic nuclei (i.e. nucleus reticularis, intralaminar nuclei and ventrolateral nuclei) that in turn projects to widespread cortical areas. A second ventral pathway projects to the hypothalamus and the basal forebrain, and further to other distributed cortical areas. Reciprocal connections exist. Thus, the area of confluence of the midbrain, the hypothalamus and the subthalamus, is crucial to the preservation of wakefulness (in the presence of largely intact cerebral hemispheres).
Penfield hypothesized that the alteration of awareness in generalized seizures was due to spread of the discharge into the 'diencephalic grey matter' 2 , which secondarily projected symmetrically to the rest of the cortex. A second postulated grey matter station carried the cortical discharge caudally, interfering with the brainstem control of wakefulness and provoking the spasms of the cranial and spinal musculature characteristic of a tonic-clonic fit. Neurologists today would probably favour a diffuse hemispheric dysfunction, rather than focal brainstem dysfunction, as the cause of loss of consciousness in generalized seizures. In part, this is due to the recognition of nonconvulsive seizures, which appear to be purely supratentorial events.
However, the message regarding wakefulness is clear: this is an aspect of consciousness of the cerebral hemispheres as a whole, in the presence of an intact brainstem. This leads to
• Observation 2: The 'wakefulness' aspect of consciousness is a property of large areas of the brain; ascending reticular activation modulates this.
GENERALIZED ABSENCES: WAKEFULNESS AND AWARENESS
Is the awake brain necessarily aware? Certainly not: witness coma progressing to the persistent vegetative state, with intact sleep-wake cycles, spontaneous eyeopening, occasional visual tracking, and inconsistent affective responses-the brain has woken, but is surely not aware. In fact, the hair-splitting goes further-we may distinguish general awareness from conscious awareness, and further distinguish the faculty of conscious self-awareness.
The generalized absence seizure appears to be the prototypical example of wakefulness with absent, or reduced, awareness. Like generalized tonic-clonic seizures, absences are characterized by widespread, bilateral involvement of the cerebral hemispheres, but cerebral processes are only interfered with 'submaximally' 14 . Despite their typical brevity, generalized absences are a rich source of information on consciousness-they have no identifiable aura or postictal state; the alteration of consciousness is entirely intra-ictal. A generalized absence is characterized by a brief (usually seconds) period of underresponsiveness; there may be a tonic stiffening, but often an ongoing motor task (especially if habitual), may continue. Indeed, a novel motor task may be performed-the patient may use a chair appropriately if sat down, or may suck at a straw placed in the mouth. The degree of under-responsiveness varies, but most patients will be described as 'inaccessible' and 'uncommunicative' during the episode; even those who seem normal will have transient identifiable deficits when cognition is tested formally under EEG control 15 .
What happens to consciousness during a generalized absence? The subject is awake, and must have a certain 'automatic' awareness (to enable motor tasks, for instance, to continue)-could it be that the cognitive deficit is largely that of loss (or diminution) of conscious awareness?
The modern understanding of primary absence epilepsy is that due to abnormal thalamocortical rhythms 16 ; this is in line with current views on thalamic neurophysiology. It has been known for centuries that the thalamus is a major sensory relay station; this prompted its presumed role as the 'gatekeeper' to consciousness. Clinicians have also long known the effects of bilateral thalamic pathology-loss of consciousness, with slow, incomplete recovery characterized by diminished responsiveness and altered behaviour. Experimental evidence for the nonspecific thalamic nuclei's diffuse cortical access has been mentioned. Modern studies of these projections in animals have confirmed two remarkable results-repetitive stimulation of the nonspecific nuclei produces spikewave discharges over the cortex accompanying a behavioural response reminiscent of absence epilepsy 17 ; the state of reactivity of the cortex (measured by muscle responses to subthreshold stimuli applied to the motor strip) can be 'tuned' up or down by the level of nonspecific thalamic afferent input 18 . In humans, thalamic activation during absence seizures has been observed by functional neuroimaging 19 . What emerges is an elegant and unifying concept for generalized absence epileptogenesis; the nonspecific thalamic efferents to the cortex, in combination with the cortex's reciprocal connections, control overall cortical reactiv-ity; in states of abnormal coupling, the electrical interaction turns into spikewave discharges that significantly alter the state of consciousness.
This begs the question: are the nonspecific thalamic nuclei (in a sense) the 'seat' of conscious awareness? It is difficult to provide an answer in the full philosophical sense of qualia, but a more limited neurophysiological answer can be given, which is: apparently, yes. Let us examine one (popular) view of consciousness 11 : this distinguishes between the central core of consciousness (called property 'C'), characterized by the 'me-ness', subjectivity, or referral-to-the-self aspect, from the contents of consciousness. Based on the widespread connections of the intralaminar thalamus, and the effects of its bilateral ablation, Bogen 11 hypothesizes that it subserves property C; the contents of C are provided by neural activity patterns in various areas of the cortex. For example, the conscious state of imagining a friend's face would 'endow' property C with the specific activity from the primary and secondary visual association areas. Conversely, if C did not exist, the face of the friend, while possibly invoking subconscious responses, would not 'reach' conscious awareness. In other words, excluding C from mental processes deprives them of their subjectivity: habitual motor activity may continue, but it is devoid of personal participation.
• 
COMPLEX PARTIAL SEIZURES: LOCALIZED CONSCIOUSNESS
The alteration of awareness in complex partial seizures is well known to the clinical epileptologist; routine clinical practice even attempts to localize epileptic foci based on ictal semiology. This suggests that consciousness, in addition to its global nature, must occasionally 'condense' onto specific cerebral sites. The work of Gloor and co-workers 20 is one source of modern data on the effects of stimulation of the unanaesthetized human cerebral cortex. It had been known since Penfield that cortical stimulation in the somatosensory strip produced elementary sensations (buzzing, temperature change) in definite body parts; stimulation in Broca's area produced the more complex phenomenon of speech arrest. Large parts of the cortex produced no identifiable response. Stimulation of the limbic structures in the temporal lobe however produced complex effects in Gloor's awake patients-intense auras variably combining perceptive, mnemonic and affective features. In one example, the right amygdala was stimulated. Following the first brief impulse, the patient responded, saying there was a feeling as though his face was covered with water. Stimulation for longer periods of time uncovered various other features of this hallucination: he was being pushed into the water by a 'big fellow'. After the stimulation ended, the patient was able to recount the whole experience-it had happened in his early childhood, when he had in fact been chased and pushed into a pond by a stronger boy. His epileptic hallucination, however, did not carry all that detail (which he later consciously recalled); the main feature of the hallucination was the feeling of having been chased, and the sensation of water covering his face. Thus, the outstanding feature of experimental phenomena (often recognized by these patients as identical to their epileptic auras), is their 'compelling immediacy' 2 to personal identity-the feeling of 'being there', as one of Gloor's patients put it.
The main areas in the human brain implicated in explicit memory (i.e. memory associated with conscious recall) are structures in the medial temporal lobe-hippocampus, amygdala, entorhinal cortex, perirhinal cortex and parahippocampal cortex-and the diencephalon-medial thalamus and mammillary bodies 21 . Laying down and retrieval of explicit memory also involves areas in the frontal lobes, which are thought to organize memories according to their semantic content and context; frontal lobe lesions therefore give rise to deficiencies in memory more properly labelled as semantic and organizational, rather than 'amnesic'. Currently accepted views 22, 23 on the laying down of explicit memory stress the importance of contextual content of the memory; that is, the spatiotemporal context, the many parallel coexisting sources of information, and the affective content that surround the memory target. The memory, while being laid down, is thus 'bound' to its conceptual and affective content; the binding being perhaps performed by amygdala and hippocampus on the basis of information channeled from the visual and auditory association areas 20 .
The polymodal character of temporal lobe auras is thus precisely due to the mechanism that lays down the memory trace-when the memory is retrieved, it surfaces with the consciousness that was 'buried' with it. Gloor 20 postulates that the temporal lobes may in fact only be the trigger points for memory: the information may exist in a distributed fashion over the entire cortex, with the limbic structures only organizing storage and retrieval. Concurrent activation of the thalamus presumably lends these retrieved modalities their personal significance.
The cerebral cortex of the frontal lobe is less epileptogenic than the temporal lobe; frontal lobe epilepsy is therefore a rarer entity and less well studied. It is also particularly clinically challenging; the ictal semiologies are varied and bizarre, and even intensive investigation is sometimes inconclusive. From the point of view of consciousness, however, some subtypes of frontal lobe seizures seem to illustrate instructive counterexamples to temporal lobe epilepsy. Nonclassical mesiofrontal seizures 24 may include tonic, dystonic, flailing or thrashing movements of the hemibody; dorsolateral spread may cause contraversive eye and head movements and a fluent aphasia. To an observer, consciousness will appear to be impaired. Nevertheless, these seizures could be described as simple partial seizures; the patient is accurately able to relate intervening events and recall commands presented during the seizure-he is only unable to respond during the ictus. Seizures arising in the anterior cingulate gyrus appear equally dramatic: shouting, screaming and aggressive behaviour are usual. (Destructive lesions of the anterior cingulate, on the other hand, lead to akinetic mutism 25 . There is severe poverty of speech and motor behaviour: a recovered patient recalled her akinetic and mute state, saying she had not spoken because 'there was nothing to say' and 'nothing mattered' 26 .) Again, cingulate seizures could be simple: the behavioural manifestations represent a form of consciousness that is 'overdriven' (in comparison with the 'underdriven' akinetic mute state) but fundamentally unaltered. Prefrontal seizures, on the other hand, lead to a rapid loss of awareness or consciousness. The prefrontal cortex has direct connections with the dorsomedial thalamus, temporal and parietal cortices; one may speculate that it is the thalamic connections that mediate the alteration of awareness-indeed prefrontal focal epilepsy may have 3 per second spike-wave EEG characteristics 24 .
• Observation 4: In addition to global hierarchical properties, consciousness has modular structure. For example, long-term explicit memory and its associated cognitive accompaniments reside in the medial temporal lobe and medial diencephalon and their connections. Complex behaviours also have cortical representations; they may occur within, or without, conscious awareness (presumably depending on the degree of thalamic participation).

SPECIAL SEIZURE TYPES: COGNITION
Most neuroscientists would endow animals with a certain consciousness-wakefulness, awareness, memory, affect and even self-awareness (witness your dog placidly walk by your neighbour, but bark ferociously at his pet). Human consciousness is, however, distinguished by (among other things) the capacity for abstract ideation and aesthetics. It is perhaps extraordinary that epilepsy should intrude here too. Epilepsy provoked by cognitive activity is rather rare, but the syndromes are distinctive and rich in phenomenological structure.
Reading epilepsy is a condition characterized by seizures precipitated by the act of reading. It is a heterogeneous condition, usually appearing in the adult years; seizures may be precipitated by the act of reading, or by one of several alternative visual provocations 27 . The epilepsy may be primary or secondary to a structural lesion; the EEG is typically normal interictally and shows a generalized spike-wave pattern during the ictus; alternatively, there may be a well-defined EEG focus even interictally 27 . Given the small (and clinically variable) number of cases reported to date, there is a lack of consensus regarding underlying mechanisms. In a proportion of the cases, though, there is clear evidence that the provocation is the higher cognitive activity associated with the reading, and not the mechanical aspects of it (scanning eye movements, jaw movements if reading aloud, etc.). Geshwin and Sherwin 28 in fact reported an exclusive language-related epilepsy-reading, writing or talking induced seizures. Linguists (e.g. Ref. 29 ) see the process of reading as the dynamic interaction of modular subsystems, involving basic vision, meaning extraction, comprehension and motor speech, in addition to other cortical mechanisms of attention and short-term memory. Some of these faculties have known cortical localizations; the process of reading requires orchestration of these topographically disparate functional subunits. An 'epileptogenic' connection anywhere in the network serves to predispose to seizures during the act.
Seizures induced by thinking and spatial tasks, on the other hand, are a subtype of the primary generalized epilepsies 30 . These patients have the clinical picture of juvenile absence, or juvenile myoclonic epilepsy; mathematical thinking or visuospatial tasks are a predictable provocation for seizures. Contrasted with Gerstmann's syndrome (dysgraphia, finger agnosia, right-left disorientation and dyscalculia resulting from dominant parietal lobe disease), this variety of epilepsy is intriguing: the complete absence of parietal lobe abnormalities on neuroimaging and EEG does however seem to be the case 30 .
Seizures triggered by music (musicogenic epilepsy) invariably occur in the context of symptomatic localization-related epilepsy arising from the temporal lobe 31 . It is clear that this is not a simple audiogenic reflex epilepsy: the seizures of musicogenic epilepsy require the complex tonal, rhythm and harmonic patterns of music for their precipitation (often highly specific for individual patients). Music is processed by the auditory association areas in the temporal lobe; recent evidence 32 points to a multimodular processing structure that is distributed between both cortices.The superior temporal gyrus houses most of the key processing modules; bilateral damage to this structure may rob a person of music appreciation ('amusia' 33 ) while leaving all other auditory capabilities intact. The nature of musicogenic epilepsy means that the condition has not been reported in 'tone-deaf' individuals (indeed, in one series, a large fraction of the patients were of above average musical ability); one may speculate whether it can, in fact, ever occur in people without music discrimination.
For the epileptologist, the existence of the cognitionrelated epilepsies is the clearest link between brain and mind. Some aspects of the mind are seen to reside in defined anatomical areas-music processing in the superior temporal gyrus, for instance (Observation 4). Reading and mathematical thinking would seem more diffusely represented. This difficulty raises two general, and important, themes: (i) does the failure of localization of certain cognitive modules imply a nonexistence of dedicated single centres for these faculties? Or, do these centres exist, but are too subtle, numerous or scattered to be resolved by currently available imaging/EEG techniques? (ii) Alternatively, does the concept of localization itself run aground? That is, are some properties of the brain 'emergent' (that is, dependent on the integrity of the brain as a whole), or effectively so?
These are difficult questions; while the observations of epilepsy help to pose them, they offer no obvious solutions. It may be that as functional imaging techniques become more widespread, more accurate 'maps' of cortical activation during cognitive tasks will provide (or exclude) some answers.
• Observation 5: The global and modular elements of consciousness may together produce a third topography: 'emerging' cognitive properties from the interaction of numerous widely distributed focal units.
THE POST-SURGICAL EPILEPTIC
Those who come to epilepsy surgery enable the study of cognition in the absence of large, confluent areas of the brain. An insight in the early days of epilepsy surgery was that of brain plasticity: some patients seemed to suffer no obvious deficit following removal of even significant areas of cortex. It appeared as though the epileptogenic tissue's functional role had been taken over, even prior to operation, by normally functioning areas of cortex. In other cases, post-operative neurological deficits disappeared with time-most dramatically, speech was observed to transfer to the minor hemisphere following dominant hemispherectomy in children under the age of ten. The operation of corpus callosotomy contributes a unique condition to neurology: the 'split-brain' patient. Experiments on post-surgical patients in the 1960s, when the first of these operations were performed for intractable epilepsy, demonstrated the laterality of cognitive function dependent on visual hemifield and tactile tasks (i.e. senses that are not bilaterally represented). It appeared as though each hemisphere had its own set of cognitive abilities, though only the dominant one could communicate this to the outside world. For instance, the articulate dominant hemisphere would deny the existence of a visual stimulus presented to the minor hemisphere; the patient could nevertheless correctly pick up a matching object (from a random selection) with his nondominant hand. The differential abilities of the hemispheres also became apparent: the dominant one possessed speech and analytic thought; the minor one appeared superior in nonverbal ideation and visuospatial ability. This notion is still held to be approximately valid, though subsequent experimentation has blurred these distinctions somewhat 34 .
Despite their cognitive deficits, the striking feature of split-brain patients is that they appear to the casual observer as the same 'person' they were prior to surgery. They are observed to feel, think and respond as before; 2 years after surgery, they may go through a complete routine medical examination without a hitch, and score at their presurgical level in verbal IQ tests 34 . Additionally, they feel introspectively unchanged. These observations have prompted those who believe in the fundamental unity of a conscious self to assert that consciousness must therefore largely reside in subcortical structures. In part, this assertion is correct. The semantic and emotional aspects of stimuli presented to either hemisphere are sensed by the opposite partner via subcortical connections leading to a fundamental unity of consciousness in terms of orientation, attitude and affect. It is nevertheless true that each hemisphere possesses its own private consciousness; under appropriate testing conditions, each can be made to respond in separate (and even contradictory) ways 34 .
More recent experiments on split-brain subjects suggest a further property of the dominant hemisphere, that of being the 'interpreter' 35 . This view envisages conscious faculties existing in both hemispheres, but the dominant hemisphere assigning an interpretation to conscious constructs. This is strikingly brought out in experiments where commands are presented to the minor hemisphere, e.g. 'laugh'. The subject predictably laughs, but the communicative dominant hemisphere has been denied knowledge of the command. When the subject is then asked why he laughed, the articulate dominant hemisphere is compelled to confabulate: the subject says something like 'I just thought of something funny'. Gazzaniga 35 draws persuasive conclusions about consciousness from such experiments. Taken together with phenomena such as 'blindsight' (the presence of demonstrable visual function in the absence of conscious visual awareness), this indicates a fundamental mode of operation of the mind. Cerebral processes are themselves invisible to conscious awareness; only selected 'products' of cerebral processing reach conscious appreciation, and these may localize to either hemisphere (or be shared by them). The dominant hemisphere additionally constructs a belief system that organizes all conscious experience: in the absence of direct information of a particular conscious experience (such as arising from a disconnected minor hemisphere), it takes a 'best guess'.
SUMMARY: OPEN QUESTIONS
Observations 1-6 indicate what epilepsy may teach about certain objective aspects of consciousness. The nested faculties of wakefulness, awareness and conscious awareness are properties that arise from the interaction of large areas of the cortex with subcortical structures. Specific cognitive skills, on the other hand, may have a dedicated topography; nevertheless, it is the projection of these 'eloquent' foci to other areas of the cortex and subcortex that gives them their overall ability, context, associations and personal meaning. Other cognitive attributes have no known localization; one may speculate whether these arise from a distributed and emergent neural processing architecture. Elucidating consciousness is perhaps most successful for the objective aspects of localized function. These are to a degree sufficiently 'explained' by the presence of dedicated cognitive processing modules for them-it is straightforward, for instance, to conceive of a computer algorithm to perform them (however complicated that may be to practically implement). The possession of these faculties by a conscious being, therefore, may be little more than the evolution of a specific portion of cerebrum that executes the appropriate 'software'. Where the issue of consciousness becomes difficult (or even impossible) are the subjective aspects of both global and local attributes. On a pragmatic level, the subjective and objective aspects can be dissociated, and the latter still studied usefully. This has been the tenor of this article, and forms the basis for meaningful communication between those who study the subject 36 .
Two profound, but potentially tractable, problems remain largely unresolved at the present time. It is not even clear where the solutions will come frombiology, physics or computational science; such being the case, the epileptologist has an equal chance as any!
The first is the so-called 'perceptual binding' problem. We have seen that consciousness has certain global, overall aspects; yet several different modular subsystems exist. Visual processing, for instance, occurs at no less than thirty-odd primary and association areas distributed over the whole brain. Even assuming the thalamus plays its role in imbuing a visual scene with the observers participation in it (Property C as before), one is left with the problem of explaining how the outputs of so many processors finally comes up with one, coherent visual percept. One may enlarge the question to the whole of self-consciousness-how does a single mental construct of a 'self' operating in an external environment arise from the hundreds of subprocesses in the brain? (Postulating a single 'centre'-the so-called Cartesian theatre-where all these subprocesses come together begs the question of who then 'sees' this college-and how.) The neurophysiological mechanism of gamma oscillationsneuronal synchrony faster than 40 Hertz-has been put forward as the 'glue' that binds the features of a percept together. These oscillations have been observed in disparate areas of the nervous system during a single cognitive or sensory task 37 ; the epileptologist recognizes these as a postulated mechanism for seizure spread as well. If this theory holds, the understanding of seizure spread will have profound implications for cognitive science. The second problem concerns creativity: how does the brain come up with something original? How did the immensely complicated (but nevertheless deterministic) neuronal network comprising Mozart's brain compose a sequence of melodies and harmonies that had never been heard before in human history (Symphony 40)?
Theories of consciousness touching on the above issues by philosophers (e.g. Ref. 38) or physicists (e.g. Ref. 39 ) flourish in the popular literature. Yet, the varied clinical material confronting the epilepsy-oriented neurologist offers a surely unique perspective. The ad-vancement of that perspective may be critical if convincing answers are to be found.
